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 1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 The EU ETS in brief 
Climate change is today perceived as one of the most serious challenges facing mankind in 
the twenty-first century. Increasing temperatures, changing rainfall, rising sea level and 
more frequent extreme weather events are some of the consequences of climate change. 
These pose a threat to human lives, to economic development and to the natural world on 
which human prosperity depends. The Fourth Assessment Report of the United Nations 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, published in 2007, stated that global green-
house gas emissions due to human activities have seen an increase of 70 % between 1970 
and 2004,1 and that most of the increase in global average temperature since the mid-
twentieth century very likely is a result of these emissions.2 
 
The European Union has established itself as a frontrunner in the international efforts to 
tackle these issues. EU leaders are determined to transform Europe into a highly energy-
efficient, low-carbon economy. In addition to preventing climate change, the ambitions 
also involve creating new sources of economic growth and jobs, strengthening the energy 
security, and saving money by reducing the dependence on oil and gas imports and by 
mitigating air pollution and its associated costs. For 2020, the Union has committed to cut-
ting its greenhouse gas emissions to 20 % below 1990 levels, sourcing 20 % of its energy 
from renewable sources and increasing its energy efficiency by 20 %.3 For 2050, a cut of 
80 % below 1990 levels is suggested.4  
 
                                                
 
1 IPCC (2007) p. 36. 
2 ibid. p. 39. 
3 European Council (2007). These targets form part of the EU’s growth strategy for the current decade, Eu-
rope 2020. The other headline targets concern employment, research and development, education and poverty 
(European Commission (2010a)). 
4 European Commission (2011a) p. 4. 
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The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) has become a key tool in the EU’s climate 
policy. Since its launch in 2005, the system has grown to be the world’s largest multi-sector 
greenhouse gas trading scheme. The objective of the ETS is to promote reductions of such 
gases in a cost-effective and economically efficient manner.5 It works by setting a cap on 
the total level of emissions that can be emitted in the power sector and energy-intensive 
industries in the EU and the European Economic Area (EEA) countries. Within the cap, 
companies can buy and sell emission allowances as needed. They can also buy limited 
amounts of international credits from emission-saving projects around the world. Over 
time, the cap is lowered in order to meet the reduction objectives. Furthermore, the cap 
generates a price on the right to emit greenhouse gases and hereby aspires to stimulate 
green investment.6 
 
During the years of operation, the ETS has found itself suffering from a number of defi-
ciencies. However, it must be recognized that the system was never expected to deliver 
flawless results from the start. Europe as such had no previous emissions trading experi-
ence to build on,7 and it was effectively acknowledged that the first phase of operation, 
lasting from 2005-2007, constituted a “learning by doing” phase.8 Nevertheless, phase I 
succeeded in establishing a transparent and widely accepted price for tradable CO2 emis-
sion allowances as well as the needed infrastructure of market institutions, registries, moni-
toring, reporting and verification.9 However, the number of allowances, based on estimated 
                                                
 
5 Dir 2003/87/EC Article 1. 
6 For more on the benefits of emissions trading in the EU, see Egenhofer (2011) p. 2. 
7 That is not to say that emission trading was a novelty for all European countries. By the time, the United 
Kingdom, Denmark and Norway had already conducted national experiments within the field. For more on 
the UK Emissions Trading Scheme, which was the first of its kind on a worldwide scale, see Makuch (2008) 
p. 261. The case of Norway is thoroughly presented in Sæverud (2006). Furthermore, the concept of tradable 
allowances was not totally unfamiliar in the EU. The quotas for Ozone Depleting Substances under the Mon-
treal Protocol, the fish catch quotas under the Common Fisheries Policy, and the milk quotas under the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy were all examples of allowances with some degree of transferability. 
8 European Commission (2000) p. 10. 
9 Ellerman (2008) p. iii. 
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needs, turned out to be too high, causing the carbon price to fall to zero in 2007.10 The 
problem of over-allocation was addressed in phase II, with the European Commission be-
ing given powers to better ensure that national allocation plans resulted in real emission 
reductions. Still, the economic crisis that arose in late 2008 depressed emissions and conse-
quently the demand for allowances, something that led to a large and growing surplus of 
unused allowances.11 By early 2012, a surplus of 955 million allowances had accumu-
lated.12 The system thus failed to provide the price signals necessary for its successful func-
tioning. 
 
Phase III, running from 2013 to 2020, sees a substantial overhaul of the ETS. Determined 
to “[f]ully exploiting the potential of the EU ETS”, the Commission proposed an amend-
ment, intending to make the system more harmonised and predictable.13 The new ETS con-
tains a number of fundamental changes. The principal element is a single EU-wide cap, 
which will decrease annually in a linear way by 1.74 %. Moreover, auctioning is from 2013 
the basic principle for allocation. This fundamental change will be the focus in the follow-
ing presentation. 
 
1.2 The scope of the presentation 
The EU ETS is in principle an economic instrument.14 It can be derived from economic 
literature that efficiency and effectiveness are aspects that make emissions trading an at-
                                                
 
10 European Commission (2013) Phase one: 2005-2007. 
11 European Commission (2013) Phase two: 2008-2012. 
12 European Commission (2012a) p. 4. 
13 European Commission (2008a) p. 3. 
14 An economic instrument can be defined as “a means by which decisions or actions of government affect the 
behaviour of producers and consumers by causing changes in the prices to be paid for these activities” 
(United Nations (2003) p. 216). This places the ETS in the same category as the Kyoto Protocol, which is 
linked to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. For more on the economics of the 
Kyoto Protocol, see Grubb (2003). 
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tractive instrument.15 However, these and many different aspects could and should be ana-
lysed from a legal point of view. This thesis aims for an understanding of auctioning, as 
employed in the EU ETS, from the perspective of three general principles of EU law. These 
are the principles of subsidiarity, equal treatment and legal certainty. They have been selec-
ted because of their conceivable relevance to the auctioning scheme. The principle of 
subsidiarity regulates, as will be shown, the distribution of powers between the Union level 
and the Member State level. When phase III introduces a more centralised ETS, with an 
EU-wide auctioning harmonisation, this is presumably of interest in light of subsidiarity. 
Furthermore, an auctioning scheme must fulfil several basic requirements in order to oper-
ate successfully. Equal treatment and legal certainty are arguably two of these. 
 
The following questions will be asked: Are the principles given consideration in the ETS 
phase III auctioning? If so, is this done in a sufficient manner? And how are they given 
consideration? Can any problematic issues be identified? 
 
1.3 Overview of the sources  
Directive 2003/87/EC16 (hereafter “EU ETS Directive”), as amended by Directive 
2009/29/EC,17 established the EU ETS, and is consequently a piece of legislation of great 
significance for presentation on the topic. The amended version of the directive sets out the 
auctioning objectives. In accordance with Article 10(4), the Commission has furthermore 
adopted Regulation No 1031/201018 (hereafter “Auctioning Regulation”), which gives rules 
                                                
 
15 See e.g. Tietenberg (1985). 
16 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a 
scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Direc-
tive 96/61/EC. 
17 Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 
2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the 
Community. 
18 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1031/2010 of 12 November 2010 on the timing, administration and other 
aspects of auctioning of greenhouse gas emission allowances pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the Euro-
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on the timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning. Likewise, this is an indispen-
sable source here. Other EU regulatory documents accompanying the legislation are also of 
interest. 
 
The primary sources of EU law, consisting essentially of the Treaty on European Union19 
(hereafter “TEU”) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union20 (hereafter 
“TFEU”), will also be of importance. Under the principle of conferral in Article 5(2) TEU, 
the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the 
Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. 
 
Case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereafter “ECJ”) is an essential 
source. As will be shown, the ECJ has played an important role in the development of gen-
eral principles. 
 
Furthermore, the EU ETS is a frequent topic in both legal and economic literature. Such 
works are clearly of significance.  
 
1.4 Structure 
In order to get a better understanding of the current phase of the EU ETS, it is expedient to 
provide some words about the preceding phases. This will be done in sections 2.1 and 2.2. 
The aim is not to give a comprehensive presentation, but merely to outline some of the 
main features and problems, relevant for what follows. The focus will thus be on the cap-
setting and the allocation. These two elements of an emissions trading scheme should be 
seen in conjunction. Thereafter, the same elements of phase III will be presented. 
                                                                                                                                               
 
pean Parliament and of the Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowances trading 
within the Community. 
19 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, incorporating Treaty of Lisbon changes, can be found in Official Journal 30.3.2010 C 83/1. 
20 l.c. 
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Section 3 will look at the place of general principles in the EU legal order and particularly 
the ETS. An aim is to find a classification that permits to put the concerned principles in a 
suiting theoretical framework. Their role in relation to the ETS will also be examined. 
 
The research questions presented above will be addressed in sections 4, 5 and 6, with one 
section for each of the three principles. First, the contents of the concerned principle will be 
set out. Then, the principle will be applied to the ETS phase III auctioning. 
 
A final conclusion is drawn in section 7. 
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2 EU climate policy and emissions trading 
2.1 Phase I: 2005-2007 
Both cap-setting and allocation were highly decentralised and negotiated processes in phase 
I of the EU ETS. In its Green Paper on greenhouse gas emissions trading within the Euro-
pean Union,21 the Commission had favoured a quite centralised approach, but this was to 
change when the proposal for the ETS Directive was put forward. The reason for this was a 
general opposition towards centralisation among the Member States.22 In order to get the 
final directive adopted, the Commission thus had to settle for a high degree of decentralisa-
tion, which implied a system entrusting some decision-making authority to the Commission 
– but also a system with ample discretion for the Member States.23 The EU ETS at this 
stage could be seen as many largely independent trading systems that had agreed to make 
their allowances commonly tradable and to adhere to certain common criteria and proce-
dures in order to make the system work.24 
 
2.1.1 Cap-setting 
The original EU ETS Directive assigned to the Member States to develop a national alloca-
tion plan (NAP) that stated the total quantity of allowances that it intended to allocate for 
that period and how it proposed to allocate them.25 In other words, each state had to decide 
its allowances ex-ante. The NAPs were to be based on 12 criteria, set out in Annex III of 
the directive, forming the basis upon which the Commission could review and eventually 
reject them.26 However, the directive did not explicitly prescribe a given number of allow-
                                                
 
21 European Commission (2000). 
22 Skjærseth (2009) p. 110. 
23 For an in-depth presentation of the making of the directive, see Wettestad (2005). 
24 Ellerman (2008) p. 5. 
25 Orig. Dir 2003/87/EC Article 9(1). 
26 Orig. Dir 2003/87/EC Article 9(3). Guidance for the Member States on the relative importance of the An-
nex III criteria were published in a Commission Communication (European Commission (2004)). 
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ances. In absence of a predetermined EU-wide cap, the total cap could thus be established 
by adding up the allowances allocated by the NAPs. 
 
Characteristic features of the NAPs of phase I were modest ambitions and high dependence 
on projections.27 Both these features could nevertheless be said to be intrinsic elements of 
the legislative framework itself, which enabled the Member States to, inter alia, set their 
allowance totals close to “business as usual” levels. But when the 2005 emissions data was 
released in May 2006, the prices saw a dramatic drop from € 30 per tonne CO2 to eventu-
ally € 0.5 in April 2007.28 The problem of over-allocation29 was consequently put on the 
agenda. 
 
2.1.2 Method of allocation 
The Member States had to allocate at least 95 % of the allowances for phase I free of 
charge.30 This allocation method has become known under the name of “grandfathering”, 
since allowances are allocated proportionally to historical emissions. The remaining 5 % 
could be allocated by means of auctioning. Still, only Denmark, Hungary, Lithuania and 
Ireland made use of this possibility.31 In total, only 0.13 % of all allowances across the EU 
were auctioned during phase I.32 
 
The allocation during these first years showed that each Member State developed its own 
rules, notably for allocation to new entrants and closures, and that these rules varied con-
                                                
 
27 See e.g. Zetterberg (2004) and Grubb (2005). 
28 Skjærseth (2009) p. 114. 
29 The concept of over-allocation is not well-defined. While the term implies that too many allowances have 
been allocated, it does not give any precise indication regarding how many excess allowances have been 
given out (Clò (2009) p. 229). 
30 Orig. Dir 2003/87/EC Article 10. 
31 Ellerman (2008) p. 38. 
32 l.c. 
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siderably between the states. This high degree of discretion increased complexity, adminis-
trative burdens and transaction costs.33 
 
2.2 Phase II: 2008-2012 
An important event that distinguished phase II from phase I was the entry into force of the 
First Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol.34 The major feature of the Kyoto Protocol 
was that it established binding targets for 37 industrialised countries and the EU35 for re-
ducing greenhouse gas emissions.36 Member States consequently needed to ensure that 
their emission strategies, in which allocations under the ETS were an important element, 
achieved their Kyoto commitments. 
 
2.2.1 Cap-setting 
The procedure for developing NAPs for phase II stayed the same.37 However, a Commis-
sion Communication, published in December 2005, gave the states less leeway on alloca-
tion in order to guarantee the achievement of their Kyoto targets.38 Furthermore, and of 
greater importance, the Commission made it clear in November 2006 that the 2005 emis-
sion data would figure as a central assessment criterion,39 making the NAPs subject to pro-
jections based this data. This enabled the Commission to shave off 10 % of proposed allo-
                                                
 
33 Egenhofer (2011) p. 5. 
34 The text of the Kyoto Protocol can be found on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change website at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php [Visited 15 November 2013]. 
35 The EU-15 (i.e. the pre-2004 EU) had a single common target to be achieved by the Member States, pursu-
ant to Article 4 of the Protocol. The so-called Burden-Sharing Agreement established the contribution of each 
individual state towards reaching this common target (Council (2002)). The EU-27 had no common target 
under the First Commitment Period. 
36 For more information on the Kyoto Protocol, see Freestone (2009).  
37 Orig. Dir 2003/87/EC Article 9(1). 
38 European Commission (2005). 
39 European Commission (2006). 
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cations in the phase II NAPs.40 The Commission had hereby “quietly and almost unnoticed 
at first” introduced quite a different model for the setting of caps than the one described in 
the directive.41 The change has also been said to de facto impose an EU-wide cap.42 
 
The introduced changes made the price per tonne CO2 go up to € 20-25 for some time, but 
it was to tumble again in late 2008 with the occurrence of the economic crisis.43 
 
2.2.2 Method of allocation 
The directive set the amount of allowances that had to be allocated free of charge in phase 
II to 90 %.44 The amount that could be auctioned accordingly increased to 10 %. As for 
auctioning countries, this number doubled to eight in phase II, which resulted in 3 % of all 
EU allowances being auctioned.45 The use of auctioning was thus still far short of what was 
allowed. 
 
2.3 Phase III: 2013-2020 
In March 2007, the European Council made an independent commitment to achieve at least 
a 20 % reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 compared to 1990 levels.46 An ob-
jective of 30 % reduction would be endorsed provided that other developed countries 
would commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and economically more ad-
vanced developing countries would contribute adequately according to their responsibilities 
and respective capabilities.47 Furthermore, the European Council endorsed a binding target 
                                                
 
40 Egenhofer (2011) p. 6. 
41 Wettestad (2009) p. 316. 
42 Egenhofer (2011) p. 5. 
43 ibid. p. 6. 
44 Orig. Dir 2003/87/EC Article 10. 
45 Ellerman (2008) p. 38. 
46 European Council (2007) p. 12. 
47 l.c. 
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of a 20 % share of renewable energies in overall EU energy consumption by 202048 and 
stressed the need to increase energy efficiency by 20 % compared to projections for 2020.49 
Against this background, the European Council invited the Commission to review the EU 
ETS “with a view to increasing transparency and strengthening and broadening the scope 
of the scheme […]”.50 
 
In order to reach these 20-20-20 targets, the Commission presented a climate and energy 
package in January 2008, comprising four legislative proposals,51 including the proposal 
for a revised ETS post-2012.52 Building on the experiences from the two preceding phases, 
the proposal contained a number of fundamental changes, entailing what some have called 
a “revolution” to the system.53 All the main elements in the proposal are preserved in the 
final text in Directive 2009/29/EC.54 The overarching change is increased harmonisation, 
with decision-making being moved from the Member States to the central EU level.55 
Phase III can therefore be seen as realising the Commission’s intentions in the Green Paper 
on greenhouse gas emissions trading within the European Union56 from 2000 to a far 
greater extent than any of the previous phases. 
 
                                                
 
48 ibid. p. 21. 
49 ibid. p. 20. 
50 ibid. p. 13. 
51 European Commission (2008b). 
52 European Commission (2008a). 
53 Carbon Trust (2008) p. 15. 
54 However, Directive 2009/29/EC is formally an amendment of the original Directive 2003/87/EC. It will in 
the following presentation be referred only to the consolidated version of the latter directive. 
55 For comprehensive presentations of the changes, see Skjærseth (2010), Thieffry (2010) and Carbon Trust 
(2008). 
56 European Commission (2000). 
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2.3.1 Cap-setting 
The principal element of the revised ETS is a single EU-wide cap, as set out in Article 9 of 
the amended version of Directive 2003/87/EC. According to the Commission, the previous 
system based on national cap-setting would not provide sufficient guarantees for achieve-
ment of the emission reduction objectives endorsed by the European Council in March 
2007.57 An EU-wide cap is also said to provide a long-term perspective and increased pre-
dictability.58 A significant consequence of this change is that NAPs are no longer part of 
the ETS as from 2013. The new provision stipulates that an EU-wide quantity of allow-
ances will be issued every year, decreasing by a linear factor of 1,74 % compared to the 
average annual total quantity issued by the Member States in their NAPs for phase II. This 
will ensure an emission reduction of 21 % below reported 2005 emissions.59 Furthermore, 
the linear reduction continues beyond 2020, as the directive does not provide a sunset 
clause. The directive states, nevertheless, that the Commission shall review the linear factor 
by 2025. 
 
2.3.2 Method of allocation 
Phase III sees a complete overhaul and harmonisation of the allocation rules. From 2013, 
auctioning is set to be the basic principle for allocation, as it, in the words of the Commis-
sion, “best ensures efficiency of the ETS, transparency and simplicity of the system and 
avoids undesirable distributional effects”.60 As opposed to the two preceding phases, free 
allocation based on grandfathering has become the exception rather than the rule. The 
move to auctioning is thus not complete, as certain sectors are still entitled to free alloca-
                                                
 
57 European Commission (2008a) p. 7. 
58 l.c. 
59 l.c. 
60 l.c. 
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tion. The Commission estimates that at least half of the available allowances as of 2013 
will be auctioned.61 
 
First paragraph of Article 10 of Directive 2003/87/EC enshrines auctioning as the basic 
allocation principle, stating that Member States shall auction all allowances which are not 
allocated free of charge in accordance with the directive. The total quantity of allowances 
to be auctioned by each Member State is divided into three categories, as determined by the 
second paragraph: 88 % of the allowances will be divided among the Member States in 
shares that are identical to the share of verified emissions under the Community scheme for 
2005 or the average of the period from 2005 to 2007; 10 % of the allowances will be dis-
tributed among certain Member States for the purpose of solidarity and growth within the 
Community;62 and 2 % of the allowances will be distributed amongst Member States whose 
greenhouse gas emissions in 2005 were at least 20 % below their respective Kyoto levels.63 
 
As for the scope of auctioning, the directive makes an important distinction between the 
power sector and other sectors. For the power sector, full auctioning is the rule from 2013 
onwards.64 The stated reason for this is that this sector has the ability to pass on the in-
creased cost of CO2.65 In other words, consideration is given to the aspect of competitive-
ness. Competitiveness could here be defined as the performance of firms relative to com-
petitor firms in terms of, inter alia, production costs and profitability.66 Hence, competi-
                                                
 
61 European Commission (2008c). On the basis of the directive proposal, the Commission had at the outset 
estimated that at least two thirds of the total quantity of allowances would be auctioned (European Commis-
sion (2008a) p. 8), but this estimate had to be lowered with the final wording of the directive. In particular, a 
group of Eastern European Member States opposed the scope of auctioning in the Commission proposal 
(European Parliament (2008)). 
62 This will increase the amount of allowances that these states auction under the first category. Annex IIa to 
the directive sets out the percentages. 
63 The distribution of this percentage among the states concerned can be found in Annex IIb to the directive. 
64 Dir 2003/87/EC Article 10a(1). 
65 Dir 2009/29/EC Recital 19. 
66 European Commission (2008d) p. 107. 
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tiveness problems are presumed not to arise in the power sector, as firms are confronted 
with the same carbon price across the EU, and can pass on the increased costs to their cus-
tomers.67  
 
The rule of full auctioning within the power sector also has its exceptions, as certain Mem-
ber States are allowed an optional and temporary derogation.68 In order to help modernise 
their electricity sector and to prevent a sharp increase in electricity prices for households, 
ten Central and Eastern European states are given the option of exempting themselves from 
the rule and continuing to allocate a limited number of emission allowances to power plants 
for free until 2019.69 If the option is applied, the state has to ensure that investments are 
undertaken in retrofitting and upgrading the infrastructure. The level of free allocation in 
2013 must not exceed 70 % of the allowances needed to cover emissions for the supply of 
electricity to domestic consumers. In each year following 2013, this percentage has to 
gradually decrease, resulting in no free allocation in 2020.70 
 
In other sectors (i.e. power-consuming sectors), free allocation will be phased out progres-
sively, with an auctioning rate set at 20 % in 2013. The rate will increase each year by 
equal amounts resulting in 70 % in 2020, with a view to reaching 100 % auctioning in 
2027.71 
 
The directive also provides for an exception from this phase-out scheme. Within the group 
of power-consuming sectors, installations exposed to a significant risk of “carbon leakage” 
                                                
 
67 If firms can pass on increased costs to their customers, higher price will induce lower demand, which will 
affect profitability as well. However, this is an intended effect of the policy, since the ETS must finally be 
translated into higher prices for consumers of carbon intensive products (De Bruyn (2008) p. 42). 
68 Dir 2003/87/EC Article 10c. 
69 European Commission (2011b). The states are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lat-
via, Lithuania, Malta, Poland and Romania. 
70 Dir 2003/87/EC Article 10c(2). The rules on gradual decrease of free allocation are set out in a Communi-
cation from the Commission (European Commission (2011c)). 
71 Dir 2003/87/EC Article 10a(11). 
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(i.e. relocation of greenhouse gas emitting activities from the EU to third countries, entail-
ing an increase in global emissions) will receive 100 % of allowances free of charge up to 
2020.72 Also, the states have the possibility to compensate the most electro-intensive sec-
tors for increases in electricity costs resulting from the ETS through national state aid 
schemes.73 The aspect of international competition is thus given due consideration. 
 
Unlike grandfathering, auctioning will generate significant revenues. These will accrue to 
the Member States. The EU budget is not affected in any way other than the Commission’s 
own administrative costs.74 The directive asserts that the Member States shall determine the 
use of revenues generated from the auctioning of allowances. Still, at least 50 % of the rev-
enues should be used to fund an array of climate change related activities, including emis-
sions reductions, financing research and development in energy efficiency and clean tech-
nologies, and assisting developing countries to avoid deforestation and increase reforesta-
tion.75 The wording of the provision suggests, however, that this is not legally binding for 
the Member States, as the directive merely states that the revenues should be used for these 
purposes. Nonetheless, the article also sets out that the states “shall be deemed to have ful-
filled the provisions of this paragraph if they have in place and implement fiscal or finan-
cial support policies”. When this is read in conjunction with the Member States’ obligation 
to inform the Commission as to the use of revenues and the actions taken pursuant to the 
paragraph,76 it could be asked whether the provision still has binding force.77 
 
                                                
 
72 Dir 2003/87/EC Article 10a(12). The Commission shall every five years determine a list of the exposed 
sectors or subsectors on the basis of the criteria referred to in paragraphs 14 to 17 of Article 10a. 
73 Dir 2003/87/EC Article 10a(6). 
74 European Commission (2010b) p. 6. 
75 Dir 2003/87/EC Article 10(3). The Commission had proposed a minimum of 20 % of the revenues, but the 
Member States were willing to raise this to 50 % in the subsequent decision-making procedure. 
76 Dir 2003/87/EC Article 10(3) in fine. 
77 Van Zeben (2009) p. 353. 
 16 
3 General principles in the EU legal order 
3.1 Notion of legal principle 
The Oxford Dictionary defines the term “principle” as “a fundamental truth or proposition 
that serves as the foundation for a system of belief or behaviour or for a chain of reason-
ing”.78 Principles can be found in all sciences. For the purpose of this text, the term must be 
set against a legal background. Legal thinking is hardly conceivable without the use of 
principles in one sense or another. In this context, the term can cover a variety of different 
situations; ranging from a minimum variant where it stands for a synthesis of individual 
rules or decisions with significant pedagogical function, to a variant where principles are 
fundamental prerequisites for a democratic state with the ability to override even clear legal 
provisions.79 This can be said to be representative for the case law of the ECJ, which dis-
plays a diverse use of the term “principle”. The term is frequently used about something 
forming an independent source of legal obligation, so that it is appropriate to speak of a 
principle of law. However, the term is sometimes used to emphasise the political import-
ance of a particular treaty norm or set of norms, or as a synthetic description of such con-
tent, but without adding any legal value.80 Given that the role of the ECJ and other courts is 
to primarily decide concrete cases, the elaboration of a clear principle definition is arguably 
of lesser importance. 
 
Legal theory has made the notion of legal principle a subject of discussion among many 
different scholars. A classic contribution comes from the American Dworkin, who pri-
marily emphasises the distinction between principles and rules.81 This can be said to be an 
                                                
 
78 Oxford Dictionaries Online (2013), available at http://www.oxforddictionaries.com [Visited 15 November 
2013]. 
79 Graver (2006) p. 193. 
80 De Witte (2000) p. 85. 
81 Dworkin (1967) p. 23. 
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unremarkable distinction – and a logical one, as he remarks.82 He states that “[b]oth sets of 
standards point to particular decisions about legal obligation in particular circumstances, 
but they differ in the character of the direction they give”.83 As opposed to principles, 
“[r]ules are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion”.84 But what principles have that rules 
do not, in Dworkin’s words, is the dimension of weight or importance.85 This dimension 
becomes evident in the case of intersection between several principles, where one must 
take into account the relative weight of each. In the distinction between principles and 
rules, Tridimas writes that a principle is a general proposition of law of some importance 
from which concrete rules derive.86 According to this definition, the constituent elements of 
a principle are two: it must be general and it must carry added weight.87 Different opinions 
between scholars concerning certain aspects of the notion of legal principle can nonetheless 
be found,88 which is unsurprising considering its vagueness and relative character. This can 
likely be attributed to varying concepts of the origin and functions of those principles and 
                                                
 
82 His distinction between principles and policies is more striking. He calls a policy a standard that sets out to 
reach a collective goal, whereas a principle is a standard that is to be observed, because it is a requirement of 
justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality (ibid. p. 23). 
83 ibid. p. 25. 
84 l.c. 
85 ibid. p. 27. 
86 Tridimas (2006) p. 1. 
87 l.c. 
88 Raz has challenged Dworkin’s view that only principles have the dimension of weight or importance. He 
contends that the same may be said of rules, having the ability to interact with one another, and to modify and 
qualify each other. This necessitates a dimension of weight and importance also for rules. Principles and rules 
nevertheless behave differently in many instances of conflict, as these “between rules are determined solely 
by their relative importance; conflicts between principles are determined by assessing their relative impor-
tance together with the consequences for their goals of various courses of action” (Raz (1972) p. 830-833). 
Jareborg argues that a legal principle always is a legal rule, namely a “should” rule, i.e. a legal rule that is not 
necessarily infringed if it is not followed (Jareborg (2007) p. 361). Furthermore, when Dworkin considers that 
principles originate not in a particular decision of some legislature or court, but in a sense of appropriateness 
developed in the profession and the public over time (Dworkin (1977) p. 40), he does not represent, as will be 
shown, the common view on how principles of EU law emerge. 
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by the fact that they may be found in different legal orders and in several fields of law.89 
Yet, it is possible to find a common consensus on the normative character of principles, in 
the sense that they serve as guidelines for policy makers and courts, but do not prescribe 
particular results.90 
 
Nevertheless, such theoretical views are overall of limited value. The importance of general 
principles must be assessed against the backdrop of practical outcomes. This is also the 
case here, in relation to the use of auctioning in phase III of the EU ETS. 
 
3.2 Types of general principles in EU law 
The treaties do not set out any particular classification of the general principles of EU law, 
nor can this be inferred directly from case law. This has thus been a task for legal theory, 
wherein many different ways of classifying can be found, typically based on criteria such 
as the principles’ contents, functions and origins.91 It should be emphasised that there is no 
particular way that has prominence or which satisfies all schools of thought. As a classifi-
cation has pedagogical purposes, different scholars have inevitably different opinions on 
the matter. The aim of this section is not to give any new contribution to this literature. In-
stead, already existing research will be resorted to, in order to find an appropriate classifi-
cation that permits to put the concerned principles in a suiting theoretical framework. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
89 De Sadeleer (2002) p. 236. 
90 De Larragán (2011) p. 92; Tridimas (2006) p. 2; Graver (2006) p. 195; Sundby (1974) p. 191; Voigt (2008) 
p. 10. 
91 For a selection, see Schermers (2001) p. 28; Bengoetxea (2001) p. 107; Boulouis (1993) p. 208; Craig 
(2012) p. 250; De Sadeleer (2002) p. 236; De Witte (2000) p. 83; Foster (2012) p. 109; Fairhurst (2010) p. 71. 
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Tridimas suggests a distinction between three types of general principles:92  
 
1) The first category consists of what he calls principles which derive from the rule of 
law. These have three distinct features: First, they have been derived by the ECJ 
from the fundamental premise that the EU legal order is based on the rule of law. 
Second, given that the EC Treaty did not provide expressly for such principles, they 
have been derived from the laws of the Member States and used to supplement and 
refine the treaties. Third, principles which belong to this category can be said to 
pre-exist written law in that provisions of the Treaty which expressly provide for 
them are understood to be their specific expressions. These principles are an in-
strument mainly for the protection of individuals against policies and administrative 
measures of the European Community and its Member States. 
2) The second category is made up of systemic principles which underlie the constitu-
tional structure of the Community and define the Community legal edifice. These 
refer essentially to the relationship between the Community and the Member States, 
but may also refer to the legal position of the individual, or to relations between the 
institutions of the Community. 
3) Principles of substantive Community law form a third category. This can be princi-
ples underlying the fundamental freedoms or specific Community policies, e.g. 
competition or environmental law. 
 
This classification offers several advantages for the understanding of the principles in this 
thesis. First, it is able to encompass elements of all the three criteria – contents, functions 
and origins – described above. It is therefore a classification that serves its purpose well, 
namely to be informative and facilitate the understanding of the principles. Second, the 
concerned principles are easily placed in their appropriate categories: Equal treatment and 
legal certainty both fall into the first, while the principle of subsidiarity falls into the sec-
ond. 
                                                
 
92 Tridimas (2006) p. 4. 
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As for their origins, the former two principles share the typical features characterising the 
principles of the first category, in the sense that they have been developed by the ECJ and 
derived from various sources, most notably the legal systems of the Member States.93 It 
should also be mentioned that the treaties themselves have provided some justification for 
recourse to general principles as a source of law, both through general provisions regulat-
ing the competence of the ECJ and more specific treaty articles, concerning e.g. non-
discrimination, enabling the Court to read these particular provisions as indicative of more 
general underlying principles.94 It can therefore be said that the Court has made use of a 
leeway that from the outset has been intrinsic in the treaties. According to Tridimas’ classi-
fication, the main principles in the second category have in the same manner emerged as a 
result of creative ECJ rulings. This is, however, not the case for the principle of subsid-
iarity. Even though this principle has also seen a gradual development, the legal framework 
has rather been constructed within the treaties – and not with the ECJ as a main player.  
 
Yet, for the purpose of this thesis, the classification gives its most beneficial contribution 
concerning as to between whom they refer. The concerned principles in the first category, 
namely equal treatment and legal certainty, aim to protect individuals against the public 
authorities, both at Union and national level. The word “individuals” is here not to be 
understood in a literal, narrow sense, but also as covering private legal entities, such as 
business firms.95 This should be accentuated, as it is firms that play a practical role in the 
EU ETS, and consequently firms to whom the legal protection offered by these principles 
could be of conceivable relevance. On the other hand, the ones in the second category, here 
represented by the principle of subsidiarity, refer essentially to the relationship between the 
                                                
 
93 For more on the influence of national laws, see Tridimas (2006) p. 23 and Akehurst (1981) p. 32. 
94 Craig (2011a) p. 110. 
95 De Witte (2000) p. 83. Indeed, much of the early cases establishing these principles were brought on by 
business firms, see e.g. Case 114/76 Bela-Mühle (equal treatment); Case 74/74 Comptoir National Technique 
Agricole (legal certainty). 
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Union and the Member States.96 As will be shown in section 4, the principle sets out that 
the EU may act only where action of individual Member States is insufficient. Hence, it is 
appropriate to talk about the principle of subsidiarity as an institutional principle, as it con-
cerns the institutional structure of the EU legal order.97 From an overall perspective, the 
biggest change that the transition from phase II to phase III of the EU ETS entailed was the 
shift of power from the Member States to the central EU level. The main changes, i.e. an 
EU-wide cap and auctioning as the primary method of allocation, hence also pertained to 
changes on the institutional level. Such changes are at the core of the principle of subsid-
iarity. This understanding of which subjects that play a part with respect to the concerned 
principles is a necessary premise for the following sections. 
 
Notwithstanding the differences between these three principles, their common features 
should also be noted. By virtue of being general principles of EU law, they all have consti-
tutional status.98 This applies irrespective of whether the principle is stated in the constitu-
ent treaties or in case law of the ECJ. Moreover, they are binding on both the Union institu-
tions and on the Member States.99 The Member States must observe the principles both 
when the measure at issue implement Union law and when the measure otherwise fall 
within the scope of Union law, as when rules adopted by the institutions apply to the case 
or that the subject-matter is otherwise governed by EU law.100 In the hierarchy of norms in 
the EU legal order, the treaties and the general principles thus sit at the top. Subordinated to 
these are legislative, delegated and implementing acts; general principles can be used not 
                                                
 
96 It can be added that ECJ on one occasion made reference to “the general principles on which the institu-
tional system of the Community is based and which govern the relations between the Community and the 
Member States” in Joined Cases 205 to 215/82 Deutsche Milchkontor, paragraph 17. Nevertheless, it has not 
developed this into a consistent doctrine of institutional principles (De Witte (2000) p. 83).  
97 Other principles in the same category include the principle of sincere cooperation and the principles of 
primacy and direct effect of Community law. 
98 Case C-101/08 Audiolux, paragraph 63; Case C-174/08 NCC Construction Danmark, paragraph 42. 
99 Case C-107/97 Rombi and Arkopharma, paragraph 65; Case C-396/98 Grundstückgemeinschaft 
Schloßstraße, paragraph 44. 
100 Prechal (2010) pp. 8-11. 
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only to interpret such acts, but also as a ground for invalidation in the case of contraven-
tion.101 It is therefore clear that ETS acts, notably the EU ETS Directive and the Auctioning 
Regulation, as legislative acts, are susceptible to judicial review by the ECJ against the 
concerned principles. 
 
3.3 Role of general principles in relation to the EU ETS 
3.3.1 Preliminary observations 
A number of arguments can be put forward to suggest that legal principles are of particular 
importance both for EU law in general and for the ETS in particular. A first argument for 
the former is the age of the EU legal order. Compared to the legal orders of the Member 
States, the one of the Union is still relatively young. It should also be added that it is a 
novel legal order, having no historical precedent or contemporary equivalent.102 This sug-
gests a greater recourse to general principles for its completion than is the case with the 
national legal orders.103 The same observations can be made for the ETS: The system en-
tered into force in 2005, and is thus reasonable to characterise as a new system. And as 
noted in the introduction, Europe as such had no previous emissions trading experience. 
The ETS therefore positively bears many of the same resemblances.  
 
Another argument is the goal-oriented character of the constituent treaties.104 As becomes 
apparent when reading the initial provisions of the TEU, a wide range of goals of political, 
economic and social character is to be achieved by legislation, administration and courts.105 
                                                
 
101 Craig (2011a) p. 109. 
102 Tridimas (2006) p. 18. 
103 Schermers (2001) p. 28. 
104 Bengoetxea (2001) p. 100. 
105 The embracement of goals is one of the features of what is characterised as the post-modern legal system. 
Applied to law, post-modernity emphasises the pragmatic, gradual, unstable nature of contemporary law. 
Other characteristics include dispersion of the law makers, fragmentation of law, decline of state authority 
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These goals should presumably be reflected in a piece of legislation like the EU ETS. 
Likewise, the ETS Directive also lays down a main objective, when setting forth to pro-
mote reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient 
manner.106 
 
It can also be argued that the dynamics and relative incompleteness of the EU legal order 
entails a need for general principles to create coherence in the rules,107 which is arguably a 
prerequisite for legitimacy and stability. A good example of this dynamic aspect is the en-
try into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which saw significant changes in the institutional 
structure of the EU, most notably the change resulting from the so-called depillarisation of 
the Union.108 Again, these characteristics can also be used to describe the ETS, with its 
different phases and continuous refinement and tuning of the system. 
 
3.3.2 In practice 
In relation to an instrument like the ETS, the influence of general principles can in practice 
assume several forms. A distinction can here be made between the influence they exert on 
the policy maker, the courts and the administration, respectively. 
 
3.3.2.1 Influence on the policy maker 
It should first be clarified what is meant by “policy maker” in this context. The EU ETS 
Directive was adopted on basis of Article 175(1) EC, which corresponds to current Article 
192(1) TFEU. The article made reference to the co-decision procedure in Article 251 EC, 
which became the ordinary legislative procedure in Article 294 TFEU after the Treaty of 
                                                                                                                                               
 
and – of particular significance here – the embodiment of principles (De Sadeleer (2004) pp. 227-231). The 
Community legal order can be said to possess several of these characteristics. See also Wilhelmsson (2003). 
106 Dir 2003/87/EC Article 1. 
107 Sejersted (2004) p. 65. 
108 For an extensive overview of the main reforms contained in the Treaty of Lisbon, see Dougan (2008). 
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Lisbon. The ETS was hence adopted according to the normal method for making EU legis-
lation. In short, the procedure consists in the joint adoption by the European Parliament and 
the Council of a regulation, directive, or decision on a proposal from the Commission.109 In 
the case of the ETS, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Re-
gions were also consulted, as required by Article 192(1) TFEU. In conformity with Article 
10(4) of the ETS Directive, the Commission alone adopted the Auctioning Regulation, as 
the Council had delegated the necessary powers, hereby derogating from the ordinary 
legislative procedure.110 
 
For the policy maker, the principles can have an enabling function, in the sense that spe-
cific implementing law must be adopted in order to breathe life into them.111 Principles are 
never sufficient on their own. Moreover, at this stage, they can also guide the policy maker 
when elaborating policies to achieve the goals set out in the treaties. The principle of sub-
sidiarity can e.g. give contributions in the legislative process as to how far a further central-
isation of the ETS would be within the limits of the EU legal framework. It is also possible 
that the principles could contribute to the creation of new procedural and even fundamental 
rights.112 Relating to the ETS, equal treatment and legal certainty are both principles from 
with such rights have the potential to be inferred. Especially in regard to a piece of legisla-
tion as the Auctioning Regulation, where it is a stated objective that auctions are conducted 
in an “open, transparent, harmonised and non-discriminatory manner”,113 could these prin-
ciples give rise to procedural rights. Finally, and as mentioned above, the principles can 
work as an instrument for the policy maker to ensure coherency in a complex system like 
the ETS. 
 
                                                
 
109 Article 289 TFEU. For a presentation of the ordinary legislative procedure, see Craig (2011a) p. 123. 
110 Article 290 TFEU. 
111 De Sadeleer (2004) p. 232. 
112 De Larragán (2011) p. 108. 
113 Dir 2003/87/EC Article 10(4). 
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It should be emphasised that the principles have the potential to exert such influence on the 
policy maker. However, due to their vagueness, it is often a prerequisite that they before-
hand go through a process where policy makers, academics and courts come to an under-
standing of the meaning and content of each principle.114 Lack of such an understanding is 
consequently a limiting factor. 
 
3.3.2.2 Influence on the courts 
For purposes of clarity, the meaning of “courts” should also be made clear. Here, the term 
can mean both the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ), which pursuant to Article 
19(1) TEU includes the Court of Justice, the General Court and specialised courts, and the 
national courts of the Member States. 
 
In the first place, the general principles serve an interpretative function for the courts.115 
The ECJ has ruled that where it is necessary to interpret a provision of secondary Union 
law, preference should as far as possible be given to the interpretation which renders the 
provision consistent with the Treaty and the general principles of EU law.116 This has been 
applied to numerous principles, inter alia the principle of equal treatment.117 Second, the 
general principles are used to fill gaps in the treaties or in acts adopted by the Union institu-
tions.118 Already early in its case law, the ECJ became aware of the situation where there is 
a lacuna in the primary law, so that the Court is “obliged to solve the problem by reference 
to the rules acknowledged by the legislation, the learned writing and the case-law of the 
member countries”.119 In the treaties, a fundamental provision is and has been Article 19(1) 
TEU (old Article 220 EC and Article 164 EEC), which charges the ECJ with the duty of 
                                                
 
114 De Larragán (2011) p. 95. 
115 Akehurst (1981) p. 29; Tridimas (2006) p. 29; De Sadeleer (2004) p. 234; De Larragán (2011) p. 111. 
116 Case C-314/89 Siegfried Rauh, paragraph 17; Case 218/82 Commission v. Council, paragraph 15. 
117 Joined Cases 201 and 202/85 Klensch, paragraph 21. 
118 Akehurst (1981) p. 30; Tridimas (2006) p. 17; De Larragán (2011) p. 110. 
119 Joined Cases 7/56 and 3-7/57 Algera, p. 55. 
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ensuring that the law is observed in the interpretation and application of the treaties. The 
word “law” has been interpreted to mean law from outside the treaties rather than some 
duplicated reference back to these,120 being said to oblige the ECJ to take general principles 
into account.121 This interpretation has enabled the Court to develop a system of legal prin-
ciples in accordance with which the legality of Union and Member State action must be 
determined.122 Third, the principles serve as grounds for review of Union acts.123 Article 
263 TFEU (old Article 230 EC and Article 173 EEC) regulates the grounds on which the 
Court may annul a Union act. The wording “infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of 
law relating to their application” (my italics) has been used by the Court to work out a doc-
trine according to which an act may be annulled also for infringement of a general princi-
ple.124 The same doctrine applies to Article 267 TFEU (old Article 234 EC and Article 177 
EEC) as concerns preliminary rulings. 
 
As for the national courts, it should be noted that the general principles may be used also as 
an aid for the interpretation of national measures which implement Union law and, more 
generally, which fall within the scope of Union law. A national court must as far as possi-
ble interpret a provision of national law which falls within the scope of Union law so as to 
comply with general principles and, if necessary, make a reference to the ECJ in order to 
ascertain the requirements of Union law in the case in issue.125 Furthermore, it is estab-
lished case law that an individual may attack the validity of a Union measure before a na-
tional court on grounds of infringement of such principles.126 However, the national court 
may not declare a Union act invalid.127 
                                                
 
120 See e.g. Joined Cases C-46 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame III, paragraph 27. 
121 Foster (2012) p. 109. 
122 Tridimas (2006) p. 20. 
123 Akehurst (1981) p. 30; Tridimas (2006) p. 31; De Larragán (2011) p. 111. 
124 See e.g. Case C-70/88 Chernobyl. 
125 Tridimas (2006) p. 31. 
126 Case C-27/95 Woodspring, paragraph 17. 
127 Case 314/85 Foto-Frost, paragraph 17. 
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3.3.2.3 Influence on the administration 
The Member States play a fundamental role in the administration of the ETS. In the context 
of this text, it should be accentuated that the Member States are charged with the adminis-
tration of the auctions and are responsible for the development of the auctioning infrastruc-
ture. Even though the current auctioning scheme is laid down in a regulation,128 and hereby 
expresses the desire to have identical rules in all the Member States, auctioning in the ETS 
will nonetheless not be an automated process. On the contrary, aspects such as access to the 
auctions, information disclosure and transparency of rules presuppose an active stance from 
the Member States. It is likely – and also desirable – that especially the principles of equal 
treatment and legal certainty can be of influence on the choices made here. 
 
For the administration, the principles can serve both a guiding function and an interpreta-
tive function. They form a backdrop against which decisions are taken, so as to enhance the 
quality of the regular auctioning administration. In the case of vague and open rules, as 
well as conflicting rules, the administration can use the principles in the process of interpre-
tation, in a similar manner to the courts. Both functions can strengthen the normative power 
of the statutory rules. 
 
However, as with the policy maker, the principles have similarly for the administration the 
potential to exert the described influence. The reservation made above should be made also 
here. Knowledge within the administration about the principles and their contents is a pre-
requisite for their influence in practice. 
 
                                                
 
128 Pursuant to Article 288 TFEU, regulations are binding in their entirety and directly applicable in all Mem-
ber States. Regulations thus constitute the most direct form of Union law. 
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4 The principle of subsidiarity 
4.1 Introductory considerations 
4.1.1 Legal basis 
The central elements of the principle of subsidiarity are enshrined in Article 5(3) TEU. The 
article reads as follows: 
 
“Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its ex-
clusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objec-
tives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at 
Union level.” 
 
A broader expression of the principle is found in Article 1 TEU, which sets out that deci-
sions should be taken “as closely as possible to the citizen”. Additionally, various other 
provisions in the constituent treaties can be seen as expressions of subsidiarity, e.g. the re-
quirement in Article 4(2) TEU to respect the national identities of the Member States and 
the categorisation of Union competence in Articles 2-6 TFEU. 
 
4.1.2 Does the principle apply to the ETS? 
As indicated by the wording of Article 5(3) TEU, it must be determined whether the Union 
action is based on a non-exclusive competence. The principle of subsidiarity only applies if 
this condition is satisfied. Pursuant to Article 4(2)(e) TFEU, shared competence (i.e. non-
exclusive) between the Union and the Member States applies in the area of environment.129 
                                                
 
129 See also Case C-114/01 AvestaPolarit, paragraph 56. 
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Consequently, the principle applies to a piece of environmental legislation like the ETS, 
and must be adhered to in the design of an allocation mechanism. 
 
4.1.3 References to the principle in the regulatory documents 
It is noteworthy that the regulatory documents contain few direct references to subsidiarity. 
Recital 30 of the ETS Directive asserts that “[s]ince the objective of the proposed action, 
the establishment of a Community [greenhouse gas emission trading] scheme, cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States acting individually, and can therefore […] be 
better achieved at Community level, the Community may adopt measures, in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity […]”. This kind of succinct formulation is, however, com-
mon in EU legislation and does not necessarily reveal the attention subsidiarity has been 
given in the legislative process. Yet, neither the Commission’s directive proposal for phase 
III of the ETS130 nor the accompanying Impact Assessment131 mentions the principle. 
 
Likewise, the Auctioning Regulation132 does not give any explicit references to subsid-
iarity. In its Impact Assessment, the Commission declares early on that the Regulation must 
respect the principle, as well as the principles of equal treatment and legal certainty.133 
Nevertheless, the following assessment does not discuss its implications. 
 
4.2 Contents of the principle 
4.2.1 Political and legal dimensions 
The principle of subsidiarity seeks to allocate responsibilities for policy formation and im-
plementation to the lowest level of government at which the objectives of that policy can be 
                                                
 
130 European Commission (2008a). 
131 European Commission (2008d). 
132 Reg No 1031/2010. 
133 European Commission (2010b) p. 6. 
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successfully achieved,134 hereby ensuring that decisions are taken as closely as possible to 
the citizen of the Union. The focus is on whether a decision should be taken at the level of 
the Union or of the Member States. Activities should not be regulated at Union level when 
the Member States are in a better position to handle it themselves. 
 
The distribution of powers between the Union level and the Member State level has 
throughout the history of the European Union been a contentious matter. Ever since its 
introduction by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992,135 the principle of subsidiarity has been 
present both in the political and legal discourse.136 While the political dimension is evident, 
and arguably important for its understanding and placement within the more general frame-
work of the changing EU polity,137 it is the legal dimension that interests us here. 
 
4.2.2 The subsidiarity test 
The wording of Article 5(3) TEU requires that two cumulative conditions must be fulfilled 
in order to justify Union action: First, the objectives of the proposed action cannot be suffi-
ciently achieved by the Member States. Second, this action must be better achieved at Un-
ion level. The approach is thus one of comparative effectiveness. Clearly, neither of the 
conditions conveys a clear-cut and precise concept – and several different interpretations 
can consequently be read into this so-called subsidiarity test. The case law of the ECJ has 
stated the justiciability of the provision,138 but has otherwise refrained from laying down a 
                                                
 
134 Inman (1998) p. 1. 
135 Although the Single European Act of 1986 established subsidiarity as an environmental principle, it was 
not until the Treaty of Maastricht that it became a general principle (Case T-29/92 SPO, paragraph 331). It 
can be argued that the principle plays a pronounced role in environmental policy, as “[e]nvironmental protec-
tion is par excellence one area where action often needs to be international to be effective” (Wilkinson (1992) 
p. 225). See also De Sadeleer (2012a) p. 76. 
136 A work that has been given considerable attention is Estella (2002).  
137 De Búrca (1999) p. 7. 
138 Case C-84/94 United Kingdom v. Council, paragraph 55. 
 31 
clear doctrine.139 This might very well be attributed to the sensitive political dimension of 
the principle. The general picture is that the Court restricts itself to examining only whether 
the legislature’s decision to exercise competence, in accordance with the conditions of Ar-
ticle 5(3) TEU, is supported by the available facts.140 
 
Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which was 
introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997,141 laid down some guidelines with the aim 
of making the concept more tangible. These guidelines are not found in its successor,142 
introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, which might be due to the development of the Com-
mission’s impact assessment process since Amsterdam, defining more specific criteria for 
applying the principle of subsidiarity.143 In the absence of clear guidelines in the case law 
of the ECJ, it is appropriate to attach significance to the Commission criteria, whose con-
tents both reproduce and further develop the guidelines that were found in the Amsterdam 
Protocol. 
 
The latest version of the Commission Guidelines asks the following five questions:144 
 
1) Does the issue being addressed have transnational aspects which cannot be dealt 
with satisfactorily by action by Member States? 
                                                
 
139 It can also be noted that have been few ECJ cases based on subsidiarity. According to Craig and De Búrca, 
just over ten cases have since the Treaty of Maastricht had a real subsidiarity challenge (Craig (2011a) p. 99). 
What is more, the question of exclusive Union competence, which is discussed in this case law, is of lesser 
importance after the categorisation of competence in Articles 2-6 TFEU, introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
140 Horsley (2012) p. 269, with reference to Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 Alliance for Natural 
Health, paragraphs 104-108; Case C-58/08 Vodafone, paragraphs 75-79. The ECJ case law is also presented 
in Ritzer (2006) pp. 740-748.  
141 Protocol No 30 (1997). 
142 Protocol No 2 (2010). 
143 Constantin (2008) p. 169. 
144 European Commission (2009) p. 23. 
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2) Would actions by Member States alone, or the lack of Community action, conflict 
with the requirements of the Treaty? 
3) Would actions by Member States alone, or the lack of Community action, signifi-
cantly damage the interests of Member States? 
4) Would action at Community level produce clear benefits compared with action at 
the level of Member States by reason of its scale? 
5) Would action at Community level produce clear benefits compared with action at 
the level of Member States by reason of its effectiveness? 
 
4.2.3 Subsidiarity after Lisbon 
Notwithstanding the absence of substantial guidelines concerning the application of subsid-
iarity in the revised Protocol and only minor changes in the wording of the principal provi-
sion,145 the Treaty of Lisbon put a strengthening of the principle on the agenda. The revised 
Protocol provides for certain new obligations during the drafting of legislation, notably by 
including national parliaments to a greater extent than before.146 Following the reform of 
the Protocol, national parliaments have for the first time the possibility to directly influence 
EU legislation.147 
 
Even though this reform does not touch upon the substance of the principle of subsidiarity, 
the developments should be mentioned here, because it shows considerations at Union level 
as to both the desired significance of the principle and as to when this significance should 
manifest itself. By means of Commission consulting on national level, it is made clear that 
                                                
 
145 The words “either at central level or at regional and local level” were inserted. 
146 Article 4 obliges the Commission to forward its legislative proposal to the national parliaments at the same 
time as to the EU legislative institutions. Pursuant to Article 6, each national parliament may within eight 
weeks, elaborate a reasoned opinion stating why it considers that the legislative proposal does not comply 
with the principle of subsidiarity (the “yellow card” system). For more on the system, see Dougan (2008) p. 
657. 
147 Höreth (2008) p. 9. 
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compliance with the principle would be more effectively achieved through a system of ex-
ante political input into the legislative procedure, rather than ex-post judicial review of leg-
islation after it has already been adopted.148 This relates to section 3.3.2 above, which de-
scribed the practical influences of principles. 
 
4.3 Subsidiarity applied to the ETS phase III auctioning 
4.3.1 Objectives of ETS allocation 
A necessary step in the present subsidiarity assessment is to determine the allocation objec-
tives. Pursuant to Article 1 of the ETS Directive, the principal objective of the ETS is to 
promote reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective and economically effi-
cient manner. More specific aspects of the system, such as allocation, must contribute to 
fulfilling this objective.  
 
As for allocation per se, a number of objectives can be identified. In the ETS Directive it-
self, Recital 7 makes clear that preserving the integrity of the internal market and avoiding 
distortions of competition are two main objectives for the allocation of allowances. This is 
somewhat more elaborated and clarified in the Commission’s Impact Assessment of the 
phase III directive proposal, which identifies the following allocation ambitions: 
 
• Environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency 
• Establishment of a level playing field and elimination of distortions of competition 
• Avoidance of unduly negative impact on competitiveness and employment of the 
EU economy 
• Minimisation of the time and administrative burden to authorities and operators 
• Avoidance of undue distributional effects 
 
                                                
 
148 Dougan (2008) p. 659. 
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It can be said that the objectives in the Directive cover those in the Impact Assessment, but 
the added precision introduced by the latter is still beneficial in the present context. 
 
4.3.2 Pre-phase III: NAPs and free allocation 
4.3.2.1 Distortions of competition 
Avoiding distortions of competition is a clear and stated objective of ETS allocation. It is 
reminded that the internal market of the EU, as set out in Article 3 TEU, includes a system 
ensuring that competition is not distorted.149 
 
As presented in sections 2.1 and 2.2 above, phases I and II of the ETS saw ample discretion 
for the Member States in the elaboration of national allocation plans, with free allocation 
based on grandfathering. The lack of Union harmonisation led to what has been described 
as a “race to the bottom” between the states.150 The term implies that each state will set its 
own requirements for pollution abatement in light of standards in rival states, in the ab-
sence of cooperation with regard to setting common environmental standards. This way, 
states will be inclined to lower their pollution abatement requirements at least to the level 
of the standards in the lowest-standard country, if not lower, to avoid a loss of competitive-
ness either in trade or in attracting foreign investment.151 In the ETS, states proved to allo-
cate emission allowances against the backdrop of allocated allowances in other competing 
states, so as to avoid a possible loss of competitiveness. Delays in submitting NAPs to the 
Commission152 could also be seen as the states’ desire to competitively orient themselves 
vis-à-vis each other.153 The system thus gave the Member States incentives to protect their 
home industries by means of generous allocations.  
                                                
 
149 Protocol No 27 (2010). 
150 E.g. Carbon Trust (2008) p. 19; Skjærseth (2009) p. 15. 
151 Porter (1999) p. 136. 
152 Only five NAPs for phase I were submitted to the Commission on time (Ellerman (2008) p. 38), while 
only Germany and Estonia were on time for phase II (Rogge (2006) p. 3). 
153 Skjærseth (2009) p. 115. 
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As identified by the Impact Assessment, a particular weakness related to allocation has 
been the treatment of new entrants on the market and closures of existing installations.154 
This was from the outset recognised by the Commission as “one of the important design 
choices in any emission trading scheme”,155 but ultimately remained a weak point through-
out the two first phases. It turned out that the Member States developed highly divergent 
rules, leading to distortions of competition.  
 
For new entrants, free allocation – despite its rationale of equal treatment – can be seen as a 
subsidy to new installations, which may both protect and encourage certain investments. 
Under phase 1, a new natural gas combined heat and power plant would e.g. in Germany 
receive allowances corresponding to 130 % of its expected emissions. The corresponding 
figures were 120 % for Finland, 90 % for Denmark and 60 % for Sweden.156 Clearly, this 
was likely to affect investment decisions. Additionally, many NAPs gave more free allow-
ance to more carbon intensive fuels,157 which was contradicting the system’s objective of 
environmental effectiveness. 
 
Closure rules can differ by restricting the benefit of keeping allowances after closure to the 
same operator, site or to investment in the same Member State.158 Most Member States 
applied closure rules stating that if an installation is closed or if production is reduced sig-
nificantly, the amount of allocation corresponding to the reduction of economic activity 
would be withdrawn.159 But firms in states who allowed for keeping the allowances in case 
of closure were put at a disadvantage in terms of competitiveness. Also this conflicted with 
the objective of environmental effectiveness, as withdrawing allocation upon closure 
                                                
 
154 European Commission (2008d) p. 93. 
155 European Commission (2004) p. 11. 
156 Egenhofer (2006) p. 4. 
157 Carbon Trust (2007) p. 3. 
158 European Commission (2008d) p. 93. 
159 Egenhofer (2006) p. 4. 
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amounts to introducing an incentive to continue an inefficient installation in order to keep 
allowances.160 
 
4.3.2.2 Windfall profits 
Another controversial issue resulting from free allocation in the first two ETS phases has 
been the rise of so-called windfall profits. The term can be defined as “unexpected profit[s] 
arising from a circumstance not controlled by a firm or an individual”.161 These are thus 
“accidental profits” that firms are unable to take into account when making business deci-
sions. The criticism has been that those industries that can pass on the additional carbon 
costs (i.e. the power sector) have had a net gain, since potential losses of revenues may be 
compensated or even overcompensated by receiving free allocation and earning windfall 
profits. Hence, the ETS has led to different distributional effects among the covered sec-
tors.162 Different ex-post studies have shown that these profits have been in the range be-
tween € 14 billion163 and € 19 billion164 for phase I. 
 
4.3.2.3 Administrative implications 
The Impact Assessment asserts that the wide range of allocation methodologies consider-
ably has increased the complexity of the allocation process and thus negatively affected 
simplicity and transparency.165 It is not further specified what this complexity consists of, 
but the finding can be elaborated in light of gathered experience from the first two phases. 
 
Negotiating allocations turned out to be a cumbersome and contentious process, both for 
the Member States and the Commission. The assessment of all NAPs for phase I took 15 
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months in total,166 which was certainly not in line with the three months foreseen in the 
ETS Directive. There were various reasons for this: First, the allocation methodologies 
gave rise to political challenges in the form of industry pressure and lobbying.167 Consider-
ing the distributional impact of the system, the affected firms also had an incentive to pro-
tect their interests by means of putting pressure on their respective governments. Second, 
the development of the NAPs was also demanding from a technical point of view. The 
wide discretion for the Member States resulted in complex allocation rules, which made the 
final outcome of the NAP process uncertain. The more special provisions applied by the 
Member States, the lower the transparency on the allocation outcome was.168  
 
As for phase II in particular, the states resorted to the concepts and methodologies devel-
oped in phase I, making the progress towards more efficient and more harmonised alloca-
tion rules generally small.169 Moreover, phase II also saw a number of Eastern European 
states bringing the Commission’s NAP decisions before the ECJ, which added further 
complications. These decisions were largely an affirmation of the Member States’ discre-
tionary powers in relation to the NAPs. Recalling the significance of the principle of sub-
sidiarity, the Court emphasised that the Commission merely enjoys a power of review – 
and not a power to substitute or to harmonise.170 
 
4.3.3 Phase III: EU-wide auctioning harmonisation 
4.3.3.1 Increased environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency 
By making auctioning the default method of allocation, the issue of over-allocation will no 
longer arise. Whereas the Member States before stated in the NAPs the total quantity of 
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allowances that they intended to allocate and how they proposed to allocate them, it is now 
for the firms to get hold of the needed allowances through auctions. The auctions will yield 
significant revenues, which will give the allowances a monetary value also for the states. 
This was not the case in phases I and II. The distributional aspects of these revenues will be 
treated in the following section, but it should here be emphasised that the change will have 
an influence on the allocation behaviour of the Member States. Before, the consequence of 
over-allocation consisted of imposing an additional burden on non-ETS sectors (as these 
sectors had to pay for the emission reductions of the ETS sectors if the state was to comply 
with its emission target) and indirectly other states' industries and consumers; now, the 
Member State would now be harming itself in failing to obtain the optimal auctioning 
revenues.171 
 
As for the treatment of new entrants and closures of existing installations, the revised ETS 
Directive harmonises the national regimes: For new entrants, it introduces an EU-wide re-
serve.172 Installations that have closed will no longer receive any allowances for free. In 
relation to closures, it should be added that auctioning strengthens the environmental effec-
tiveness of this harmonisation, as it gives incentives to replace an inefficient installation 
with a more a more efficient one. When an incumbent does not replace an inefficient tech-
nology in a timely manner a newcomer will do so and push the obsolete installation out of 
the market.173 Also for new entrants that are not entitled to free allocation from the afore-
mentioned reserve (i.e. the power sector), auctioning gives strong incentives to invest in 
low-carbon technology. 
 
It is understood that windfall profits will by and large disappear with auctioning, since the 
industries that can pass on the additional carbon costs (i.e. the power sector) can no longer 
                                                
 
171 Van Zeben (2009) p. 353. 
172 Dir 2003/87/EC Article 10a(7). 
173 Egenhofer (2007) p. 9. 
 39 
profit from free allowances.174 For industries that do not have this possibility, the recycling 
of auction revenues can alleviate this disadvantage. 
 
Moreover, the Commission has stated that auctioning best complies with the polluter-pays 
principle.175 There seems to be a general agreement in legal theory about the validity of the 
view.176 The polluter-pays principle is set out in Article 191(2) TFEU, along with the other 
principles on which EU environmental policy is based. Its main function is to internalise 
the social costs borne by the public authorities for pollution prevention and control.177 By 
having to buy allowances through auctions, such costs are effectively internalised by the 
polluting firms. 
 
4.3.3.2 Distributional aspects 
The auctioning will generate significant revenues for the states.178 With the progressive 
phasing out of free allocation, these revenues are also going to increase in the coming 
years. As presented in section 2.3.2, the rules in the current ETS Directive assert that the 
Member States shall determine the use of revenues. Still, at least 50 % of the revenues 
should be used to fund different climate change related activities. The novelty of being able 
to dispose such financial means is arguably an important element in a subsidiarity discus-
sion, as it shows that the major revision of the ETS did not only entail a shift of power from 
the Member States to the central EU level. 
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The revenues not specifically earmarked by the ETS Directive could be used for a wide 
range of distributional purposes. Two main categories can here be distinguished, namely 
recycling to the industry for mitigation of competition and recycling to households for 
social purposes. It can be argued that both these two categories have legitimate reasons to 
benefit from the revenues. Recycling to the industry can be in the form of e.g. a decrease in 
income tax and corporate taxes,179 which offers what has been called a “double dividend”, 
as both the environment improves and costs of the tax system are reduced.180 Recycling to 
households can be done by means of e.g. improvement of social security systems. This 
would mitigate the overall impacts of the increase in the cost of living resulting from inter-
nalised carbon costs.181 Also, the states are free to use more than 50 % of the revenues on 
the climate change related activities listed in Article 10(3) of the ETS Directive. 
 
4.3.3.3 Transparency and simplicity 
The Commission states that auctioning is transparent and simple.182 When auctioning is 
compared to the grandfathering in phases I and II, the statement is very likely to hold true. 
If seen from an overall European level, it is clearly easier to have an overview over one set 
of harmonised auctioning rules than 31 different national allocation procedures and an 
equal number of Commission approvals. Also if seen from a national level, auctioning is 
advantageous: First, challenging NAP negotiations are no longer necessary. Second, auc-
tioning can offer several benefits from a point of view of transparency and simplicity. It 
must, however, be emphasised that this does not apply unconditionally. As has been noted 
in economic theory, good auction design is not “one size fits all”, but rather something that 
must be sensitive to the details of the context.183  
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With regard to auction format, the Auctioning Regulation opts for a “single round, sealed-
bid uniform-price auction”.184 The Member States are not free to choose another format. 
Furthermore, the Auctioning Regulation harmonises several other aspects that can be re-
lated to transparency and simplicity, such as market access,185 submissions and with-
drawal,186 and timing of the auctions.187 It also regulates the publication of different auction 
documents188 and the announcement and notification of the auction results.189 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
Although the principle of subsidiarity was seemingly not given great attention in the legis-
lative process, it should on the basis of the preceding analysis be concluded that EU-wide 
auctioning harmonisation seems to be sufficiently and well justified. The stated main objec-
tives of ETS allocation, namely preserving the integrity of the internal market and avoiding 
distortions of competition, will be better achieved by the current harmonisation. What sup-
ports this conclusion is not only legal and economic considerations on a theoretical level, 
but also strong evidence from the two first ETS phases. Phases I and II positively demon-
strated that allocation largely at the discretion of the Member States failed to yield the de-
sired results. It can moreover be added that the ECJ did not approve of the Commission’s 
increasingly pro-active approach in relation to the assessment of the NAPs. The Court thus 
made clear that this sort of quasi-harmonisation was not a viable solution either. 
 
When it comes to the specific auction design, the Auctioning Regulation imposes a high 
degree of harmonisation. The principle of subsidiarity could perhaps suggest more national 
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discretion in the design, but several arguments can be made against this: First, the experi-
ence with different national approaches to allocation proved unsuccessful. Another nega-
tive experience could be the outcome if the Member States were to introduce different auc-
tion designs. Second, considering the lack European experience with auctioning of emis-
sion allowances, the different states were unlikely to have a preference for a specific 
national design at the outset. There were therefore few expectations to take into account 
with respect to this. Third, the lack of experience also suggested early Union action, as any 
future national preference could impede harmonisation at a later stage. A downside of the 
present harmonisation is, however, that there is little room for a healthy competition be-
tween different national policies. Such competition can result in valuable experiences that 
can be benefited from at EU level. But again, this approach was not successful as regards 
allocation in phases I and II. 
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5 The principle of equal treatment 
5.1 Introductory considerations 
5.1.1 Legal basis 
The constituent treaties have always contained some references to the principle of equal 
treatment, most notably the provisions on nationality discrimination and equal pay. These 
provisions sought to establish equal treatment between the factors of production within the 
internal market. However, it is due to the endeavours of the ECJ that the principle evolved 
into a principle of general application, whose scope goes beyond what is required by an 
internal market rationale.190 As concerns the ETS auctioning, it is the substantive concept 
of equality as developed by the ECJ that is of interest. In the words of the Court, the con-
cept implies that “comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situa-
tions must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified”.191 
 
Moreover, a broad expression of the principle is articulated in Article 2 TEU, which lists 
equality as one of the values on which the Union is founded. 
 
5.1.2 Demarcation between equal treatment and subsidiarity 
It can be argued that equal treatment is one of the elements that should be considered in a 
subsidiarity assessment. If regulation at Union level of a given activity entails more eq-
uality for the concerned parties, then this is an argument in favour of regulation at this level 
and not regulation at national level. Of the aspects discussed in the previous subsidiarity 
section, equal treatment can be said to be an underlying premise, especially with regard to 
competitiveness. When the ETS is better served by auctioning than free allocation based on 
grandfathering, it is, inter alia, because the former treats the stakeholders more equally. 
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With the aim of avoiding duplication of the arguments presented above, the present section 
will assess the principle of equality against the current auctioning scheme in itself. The ap-
proach will thus not be to compare the phase III auctioning with what has been, which has 
already been done under the principle of subsidiarity, but rather try to identify some eq-
uality issues that might arise in relation to the current scheme, as primarily laid down in the 
Auctioning Regulation. 
 
5.1.3 References to the principle in the regulatory documents 
It is recalled that the ETS auctioning scheme was finalised with the adoption of the Auc-
tioning Regulation. The Regulation and the accompanying Impact Assessment would hence 
be documents of great interest when looking for references to the principle of equal treat-
ment. References in earlier documents to equality aspects of auctioning as such, or in rela-
tion to other allocation methods, are of less relevance here, as they do not take the current 
scheme into account. However, in the determination of the main objectives to be achieved 
in the design of the scheme, Article 10(4) of the ETS Directive sets out non-discrimination 
as a main priority. When it comes to the more specific features, the article states that auc-
tions shall be designed to ensure that operators have full, fair and equitable access, as well 
as access to the same information at the same time. These objectives clearly aim to safe-
guard the principle of equal treatment and show that it was given consideration in the legis-
lative process.  
 
The auctioning objectives in the ETS Directive are expressed and transformed into concrete 
provisions in the Auctioning Regulation. Even though the Regulation does not directly 
mention the principle, the main objectives on which it is based make clear that this should 
not be interpreted as indicative for the attention given in the auctioning rules. 
 
5.2 Contents of the principle 
It can be derived from the case law of the ECJ that an equal treatment assessment is a two-
step process: First, it must be determined whether there is a difference in treatment between 
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two firms. Second, it must then be determined whether any eventual difference in treatment 
can be objectively justified. 
 
5.2.1 Step I: Identifying a difference in treatment 
A breach of the principle of equal treatment as a result of different treatment presumes that 
the situations concerned are comparable, having regard to all the elements which character-
ise them. It is settled case law the criterion of competition is decisive in the field of eco-
nomic law.192 Here, the characteristics of both the products in question and the implied 
firms can be or relevance. In the case of ETS auctioning, the focus should be on the latter. 
Case law shows that the Court might have regard to the firms’ production193 or to their 
legal structure.194 
 
An essential condition is also the difference in treatment itself, which consists in treating 
like cases differently, involving a disadvantage for some firms in relation to others.195 
 
5.2.2 Step II: Justification for a difference in treatment 
The principle of equal treatment will not, however, be infringed if the different treatment is 
justified. Although difficult to define in the abstract,196 the ECJ has indicated that the deci-
sive criterion is that the difference in treatment must not be arbitrary,197 i.e. it must be ade-
quately justified and based on objective criteria.198 
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5.2.3 Role in the field of economic law 
It could be claimed that the principle of equal treatment acquires a particular role in eco-
nomic law, due to the association with the internal market. Advocate General Tesauro has 
convincingly argued that “if, in this field, different rules are laid down for similar situa-
tions, the result is not merely inequality before the law, but also, and inevitably, distortions 
of competition which are absolutely irreconcilable with the fundamental philosophy of the 
common market”.199 Nevertheless, the Court has made clear that the scope of the principle 
also here has its limitations, as it is practically impossible to consider every difference that 
may exist among economic operators.200 
 
5.3 Equal treatment applied to the ETS phase III auctioning 
5.3.1 Auction platform 
The term “auction platform” refers to the IT system used by an auctioneer to run an auc-
tion.201 In theory, it could be left to the Member States to develop their own auctioning 
infrastructure, hereby allowing for different national solutions. The Auctioning Regulation, 
however, foresees the establishment of a common infrastructure where a common auction 
platform conducts the auctions.202 According to the legislature, this harmonisation entails a 
number of advantages, including non-discriminatory access to the auctions.203 Particularly 
emphasised is the situation for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which would 
be faced with burdensome costs in the process of becoming familiar and registering with, 
as well as participating in, more than one auction platform.  
 
                                                
 
199 Case C-63/89 Assurances du Crédit, p. 1829. 
200 Joined Cases 17/61 and 20/61 Klöckner, p. 340. 
201 European Commission (2010b) p. 33. 
202 Reg No 1031/2010 Article 26. 
203 Reg No 1031/2010 Recital 7. 
 47 
Nevertheless, to mitigate risk of reduced competition in the carbon market, the Regulation 
provides for the possibility for Member States to opt-out of the common auction plat-
form.204 
 
The European Energy Exchange (EEX) in Leipzig is the common platform for the large 
majority of countries participating in the EU ETS.205 Germany,206 United Kingdom207 and 
Poland208 have made use of the opt-out possibility. 
 
5.3.2 Access to the auctions 
Equal access to the auctions is a clear prerequisite for non-discriminatory auctioning. Even 
if the subsequent auction process is fair, this will be to little avail for firms who have to 
overcome insurmountable obstacles in order to participate. Such obstacles could be of both 
formal character (firm size, capital structure, etc.) and practical character (inaccessible in-
formation about participation, language barriers, etc.). Yet, as pointed out in Auctioning 
Regulation’s Impact Assessment, there is a trade-off between openness and the cost of 
know-your-customer checks, given the need to protect the integrity of the market and avoid 
abuse of auctions for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing.209 
 
Article 16 of the Auctioning Regulation declares that an auction platform shall provide for 
the means to access its auctions on a non-discriminatory basis. The Regulation distin-
guishes between eligibility and requirements for admission to bid. Article 18(1)-(2) lists the 
different categories of participants eligible to bid, which include, inter alia, ETS operators, 
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208 Poland intends to appoint an opt-out auction platform but will use the common auction platform in the 
meantime (European Commission (2013) p. 5). 
209 European Commission (2010b) p. 11. 
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investment firms and credit institutions authorised and regulated under EU law, and public 
bodies or state-owned entities that control ETS operators. What should be specifically 
noted here is the possibility to use intermediaries, which facilitates access for notably 
SMEs. Potential bidders must also fulfill the admission requirements in Article 19(2), 
where a number of formalities are specified, such as establishment in the EU, account in-
formation and appointment of at least one bidder’s representative. Furthermore, it is also 
required that the bidders comply with the exchange rules of the auction platform. For the 
time being, this means the rules of the EEX for the large majority of the Member States.210 
 
Of relevance to equality is also the requirement in Article 17, with address to the auction 
platform, of making available a helpline service accessible by telephone, facsimile and 
electronic mail.211 Easily available information about e.g. access to the auctions can remedy 
some of the inequalities that may exist at the outset in the level of knowledge between the 
firms. 
 
5.3.3 Auction process 
Article 5 of the Auctioning Regulation states that the auctions shall be carried out through 
an auction format whereby bidders submit their bids during one given bidding window 
without seeing bids submitted by other bidders. Furthermore, each successful bidder pays 
the same auction clearing price, regardless of the price specified in the bid. The Regulation 
thus makes the single round, sealed-bid uniform-price auction the mandatory auction for-
mat.212 This is in principle a simple design that enables all bidders to bid on equal footing, 
                                                
 
210 These requirements can be found on the EEX website at 
http://www.eex.com/en/EEX/Products%20%26%20Fees/Emission_Allowances/Phase_3_Auctions/Rules_Re
gulation [Visited 15 November 2013]. 
211 An “auction hotline”, open from Monday to Friday, has been established by the EEX. For more informa-
tion, see http://www.eex.com/en/Auction [Visited 15 November 2013]. 
212 See presentations of the different formats in Cramton (2002) pp. 336-338, Klemperer (1999) pp. 229-230 
and Frontier Economics (2008) pp. 5-9. 
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irrespective of size, level of information or experience. In economic literature, the possibili-
ties the sealed-bid auction gives smaller bidders have been especially highlighted. Since an 
advantaged bidder must make its single final offer in the face of uncertainty about its ri-
vals’ bids, and because it wants to get a bargain, its sealed-bid will not be the maximum it 
could be pushed to in an ascending auction (which would be the main alternative format to 
the sealed-bid auction).213 Consequently, smaller bidders have a greater chance of winning 
the auction. This may lead to a less efficient outcome than in the case in an ascending auc-
tion,214 but the Regulation can be said to let equality outweigh efficiency in this respect. 
Moreover, by giving smaller bidders greater chance, participation also becomes more at-
tractive, something which may improve efficiency in this way instead. 
 
As regards information, Article 17 obliges the auction platform to offer a practical web-
based training module on the auction process it is conducting, including guidance on how 
to complete and submit any forms and a simulation of how to bid in an auction.215 Ques-
tions concerning the auction process could also be addressed to the mandatory helpline 
service mentioned in the previous section.216 
 
5.3.4 Supervision 
The Member States shall appoint one independent auction monitor for all auction pro-
cesses, in accordance with Article 24, whose functions consist of monitoring and reporting 
on compliance of the auction process with the objectives of Article 10(4) of the ETS Direc-
tive, on the compliance with the provisions of the Regulation, and on any evidence of anti-
competitive behaviour, or market abuse. As seen above, Article 10(4) enshrines non-
discrimination as a main objective. 
                                                
 
213 Klemperer (2002) p. 180. 
214 l.c. For more on this inefficiency, see Ausubel (2002). 
215 The EEX Auction Tutorial can be found at http://streaming.eex.com/pws-june/EUA_Auction_v1.htm 
[Visited 15 November 2013]. 
216 See supra note 211. 
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Additionally, the Member State in which an auction platform is located must, pursuant to 
Article 35(4) of the Regulation, ensure that the competent authorities of that Member State 
are able to authorise and supervise the auction platform in accordance with the national 
measures transposing Title IV of Directive 2004/39/EC (the Markets in Financial Instru-
ments Directive) to the extent relevant. This requires the state to, inter alia, provide for a 
right to appeal a decision to the courts. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
The preceding sections have made it evident that the principle of equal treatment occupies 
a distinct place in the ETS phase III auctioning. First, the principle has a strong manifesta-
tion in the main objectives for the auctioning, as Article 10(4) of the ETS Directive posi-
tively states that the auctions must be conducted in a non-discriminatory manner. Particular 
attention is also given to SMEs, which is category of firms that is especially susceptible in 
market-based mechanisms such as the EU ETS. Second, as regards auction platform, auc-
tion access and process, as well as supervision, the principle of equal treatment is given 
clear consideration. The mandatory auction format – the single round, sealed-bid uniform-
price auction – seems particularly suitable for safeguarding the principle. 
 
Experience from the months following the entry into force of phase III does not seem to 
have revealed any particular issues in relation to equality. The observation is based on the 
Commission’s regular auction reports,217 which again are based on the reports submitted by 
the EEX, on discussions between the Commission, its advisors and the EEX and on any 
further relevant information available to the Commission. Furthermore, no case concerning 
the matter has yet been brought before the ECJ.  
 
                                                
 
217 These reports are available at the Commission’s website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/auctioning/documentation_en.htm [Visited 15 November 2013]. 
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It must nevertheless be reminded that the current auctioning scheme is still young and that 
challenges may arise at a later time. Any eventual claim of breach of the principle must 
then be assessed against the two-step process presented above. Fortunately, the current 
situation does seemingly not necessitate this as of now. 
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6 The principle of legal certainty 
6.1 Introductory considerations 
6.1.1 Legal basis 
The principle of legal certainty forms an integral part of unwritten Union law. No provision 
in the constituent treaties makes explicit reference to this concept. Case law, on the other 
hand, shows that legal certainty has a wide scope that appears axiomatic to democratic 
societies and, consequently, common to the legal orders of the Member States.218 However, 
in its basic form, the ECJ has constantly held that Union legislation must be clear and pre-
dictable for those who are subject to it.219 A more precise concept, of relevance to the ETS 
auctioning, will be elaborated in section 6.2. 
 
6.1.2 Demarcation between legal certainty and subsidiarity 
What was observed in the corresponding section under the principle of equal treatment can 
be reiterated in the case of legal certainty. Also here, it can be argued that legal certainty is 
one of the elements that should be considered in a subsidiarity assessment. If Union regula-
tion increases clarity and predictability of the activity at issue, then this is an argument 
against retaining national regulation. E.g. both the Member State discretion in the elabora-
tion of NAPs, and the subsequent Commission review, as well as the issue of windfall prof-
its, implied significant uncertainty for stakeholders and states in phases I and II. These 
situations will not arise in phase III, hereby presumably making for a more clear and pre-
dictable system. 
 
                                                
 
218 Groussot (2006) p. 189. 
219 See e.g. Joined Cases 212 to 217/80 Salumi, paragraph 10; Case 257/86 Commission v. Italy, paragraph 
12; Case C-325/91 France v. Commission, paragraph 26; Case C-63/93 Duff, paragraph 20; Case C-343/09 
Afton Chemical, paragraph 79. 
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As with the principle of equal treatment, the present section will assess the principle of 
legal certainty against the current auctioning scheme in itself, as primarily laid down in the 
Auctioning Regulation. 
 
6.1.3 References to the principle in the regulatory documents 
Article 10(4) of the ETS Directive lays down openness and transparency as main objectives 
of the auctioning. Furthermore, the paragraph states that the process has to be predictable, 
in particular as regards the timing and sequencing of auctions and the estimated volumes of 
allowances to be made available. These objectives can be regarded as explicit references to 
the principle of legal certainty. 
 
The requirement of full, fair and equitable access for operators and access to the same in-
formation at the same time should likewise be mentioned. This was also done under the 
principle of equal treatment, but as these objectives could contribute to more clarity and 
predictability as well, they should not be overlooked in the present section. 
 
The Auctioning Regulation asserts that the provisions on submission and processing of 
applications for admission to bid, as well as a wide range of practical aspects of the auction 
process (e.g. possibility to withdraw or modify submitted bids and protection of confiden-
tial information), are necessary due to legal certainty.220 
 
6.2 Contents of the principle 
6.2.1 Concept 
According to settled case law of the ECJ, the principle of legal certainty requires that rules 
should be clear and precise, so that individuals may be able to ascertain unequivocally what 
                                                
 
220 Reg No 1031/2010 Recitals 26 and 54. 
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their rights and obligations are and may take steps accordingly.221 In case of ambiguities, 
the case is resolved in favour of the individual.222 Yet, beyond these basic features, the case 
law reveals a broad concept whose content is difficult to concretise.223 Its character of 
“umbrella principle”, being composed of specific sub-concepts (e.g. non-retroactivity, ac-
quired rights and legitimate expectations), further adds to the complexity.224 
 
Notwithstanding the diffuse nature of the principle, the starting point is well-defined: EU 
legislation must be clear and predictable. Moreover, the ECJ has used legal certainty to 
reinforce the binding character of the legislation and the obligations which ensue for the 
Member States.225 In areas covered by Union law, national rules should be worded unequ-
ivocally so as to give the persons concerned a clear and precise understanding of their 
rights and obligations and enable national courts to ensure that those rights and obligations 
are observed.226 Furthermore, the ECJ has used the principle to safeguard the integrity of 
the EU legal order.227 
 
6.2.2 Role in the field of economic law 
Also the principle of legal certainty plays a particular role in economic law. This has been 
explicitly acknowledged by the ECJ, which has ruled that “certainty and foreseeability are 
requirements which must be observed all the more strictly in the case of rules liable to en-
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tail financial consequences”.228 Still, this has an important limitation, as the Court has 
pointed out that economic agents cannot legitimately expect that they will not be subject to 
restrictions arising out of future rules of market or structural policy.229 
 
In addition to the regulatory risk that firms must accept, there are also a great variety of 
other risks inherent to economic life, such as commercial risks, strategic risks and envi-
ronmental risks.230 To state the obvious, the principle of legal certainty cannot protect 
against such risks. 
 
6.3 Legal certainty applied to the ETS phase III auctioning 
6.3.1 Long-term framework 
The EU is determined to transform Europe into a highly energy-efficient, low-carbon econ-
omy. In section 1.1, it was noted that the Union has committed to cutting its greenhouse gas 
emissions to 20 % below 1990 levels for the short term (i.e. 2020).231 For the long term (i.e. 
2050), a cut of 80 % is suggested. The ETS is given a key role in these reductions – and 
auctioning is set to be the basic principle for allocation. It is recalled that the auctioning 
rate will increase each year by equal amounts resulting in 70 % in 2020, with a view to 
reaching 100 % auctioning in 2027.232 The Auctioning Regulations contains detailed rules 
on the annual volumes.233 
                                                
 
228 Case C-30/89 Commission v. France, paragraph 23. Also Case 326/85 Netherlands v. Commission, para-
graph 24. 
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233 Reg No 1031/2010 Articles 10 and 12. 
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The legislature has thus made auctioning part of a long-term framework. Stakeholders 
know not only that the ETS will continue until 2020 and beyond, but also that the use of 
auctioning will increase and effectively become the default method of allocation. This as-
surance should add to the legal certainty of the auctioning, notwithstanding the more spe-
cific features of the scheme. 
 
6.3.2 Auction platform 
As presented under the principle of equal treatment, the Auctioning Regulation favours a 
common infrastructure where a common auction platform conducts the auctions.234 It is 
claimed that this also leads to more openness and transparency,235 which according to case 
law are two components of legal certainty. The common platform is also said to ensure the 
predictability of the auction calendar and best strengthens the clarity of the carbon price 
signal.236 
 
Germany, United Kingdom and Poland have, as noted under equal treatment, made use of 
the possibility to opt-out of the common auction platform. Time will show whether more 
states will follow. From a point of view of legal certainty, it should be asked how any even-
tual national platform takes the principle into account. Clearly, the advantages of the com-
mon platform will not be actualised in the case of national platforms. 
 
6.3.3 Access to the auctions 
The Auctioning Regulation contains detailed provisions on the access to the auction. First, 
it sets out the eligibility237 and requirements238 for admission to bid. These were above pre-
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sented from the perspective of equal treatment. In the present section, the provisions should 
be scrutinised from the perspective of clarity. Although difficult to do in the abstract, they 
do seem to set out the two respective categories in a clear and predictable manner, leaving 
no apparent doubt as to who can access the auctions. Still, practice will show whether this 
observation holds up. 
 
Also provisions on the submission and processing of applications for admission to bid,239 
as well as any refusal, revocation or suspension of admission240 are laid down in the Regu-
lation. The provisions are detailed, yet easily comprehensible through an ordinary under-
standing of the wording. Again, their functioning in practice will be decisive. 
 
The helpline service of the auctioning platform will also be of avail to bidders in need of 
clarification of the rules.241 
 
6.3.4 Auction process 
As previously mentioned, Article 5 of the Auctioning Regulation adopts the single round, 
sealed-bid uniform-price auction. The format has been chosen owing to, inter alia, its sim-
plicity.242 A single round, as opposed to multiple rounds, and the fact that bidders are un-
able to see bids submitted by other bidders, are both factors that should simplify the auction 
process. Having limited opportunity to follow the process by which the price is set also 
implies, however, less transparency.243 Yet, this aspect also makes the sealed-bid auction 
less susceptible to manipulation, which is clearly beneficial from a legal certainty point of 
view. As bidders do not know each other's bids, they cannot act together to avoid bidding 
                                                                                                                                               
 
238 Reg No 1031/2010 Article 19. 
239 Reg No 1031/2010 Article 20. 
240 Reg No 1031/2010 Article 21. 
241 See supra note 211. 
242 Reg No 1031/2010 Recital 17. 
243 Frontier Economics (2008) p. 14. 
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up the allowance price ("collusion"), neither explicitly nor tacitly.244 Consequently, lower 
probability for such behaviour potentially offsets the downside of less transparency in the 
bidding. 
 
Despite the sealed bidding, tied bids are still possible. The Regulation's solution is to sort 
these bids through a random selection according to an algorithm determined by the plat-
form before the auction.245 This adds predictability to the auctioning. 
 
The auctioning platform’s helpline service could also in relation to the auction process as-
sist in clarification of the rules.246 
 
6.3.5 Supervision 
Legal certainty can be said to be the rationale behind a system of supervision in any eco-
nomic instrument. The Auctioning Regulation puts in place two separate bodies for super-
vision of the auctions: First, there is the monitor for all auctions on all auction platforms, 
appointed by the Member States,247 who reports on compliance with, inter alia, the objec-
tives of Article 10(4) of the ETS Directive.248 Second, the competent national authority for 
financial markets of the Member State in which an auction platform is located is respon-
sible for supervising that auction platform.249 The Regulation consequently places a high 
importance on supervision. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
The principle of legal certainty has a solid foundation in the ETS phase III auctioning. 
First, elements of the principle, namely openness and transparency, are expressed in the 
main objectives for the auctioning in Article 10(4) of the ETS Directive. Second, the prin-
ciple seems to have been duly taken into account in the Auctioning Regulation. A third 
point of relevance is that auctioning is made the basic principle for allocation in a system 
that is intended to run for a long period of time. All these elements should make for cer-
tainty and foreseeability, which are requirements that the ECJ has stated that must be 
strictly observed when it comes to rules liable to entail financial consequences. Neverthe-
less, it should be stressed that it must be left to practice to determine the accuracy of this 
conclusion. So far, however, no issues seem to have arisen – at least not according to the 
Commission’s regular auction reports.250 Also, the ECJ has not yet had to deal with the 
matter. 
 
Yet, it should be recalled that the current scheme has been in force only since 2013 and is 
therefore still in its infancy. As was the case with NAPs and free allocation in phases I and 
II, it is also likely that the auctioning becomes subject to some refinement and tuning as 
experience with its functioning is gathered. Despite the findings here, it is more than con-
ceivable that the scheme is not perfect from the perspective of legal certainty – and that this 
will underlie future improvements. 
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7 Final conclusion 
Phase III of the EU ETS has seen a major revision of the system. The revised ETS contains 
a number of fundamental changes. This thesis has focused on one of these, namely auction-
ing, which has become the basic principle for allocation of emission allowances. The pre-
ceding sections have seen the current auctioning scheme in light of the EU law principles 
of subsidiarity, equal treatment and legal certainty. Under each principle, the conclusion 
has been that the scheme sufficiently considers that particular principle. 
 
The principle of subsidiarity is an institutional principle that regulates the distribution of 
powers between the Union level and the Member State level. It has been shown that EU-
wide harmonisation of auctioning is well justified from a point of view of subsidiarity, des-
pite the apparent lack of attention the principle was given in the legislative process. When 
it comes to the principles of equal treatment and legal certainty, which in the present con-
text aim to protect participating firms, several references to these can be found in the main 
auctioning objectives in the ETS Directive and they are well reflected in the concrete pro-
visions of the Auctioning Regulation. 
 
The EU ETS establishes a market that does not emerge naturally by means of regular sup-
ply and demand, but rather develops as a result of a specific political objective. Conse-
quently, the ETS market relies extensively on its institutional setting, which must deter-
mine how emission allowances are established, treated and traded. General legal principles 
can arguably play an important role in this setting, as this thesis has evidenced in relation to 
auctioning. The coming years will see further development of the ETS. It is likely that legal 
principles will exert their influence also here. 
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